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The Res Judicata Effect of Bankruptcy
Court Judgments: The Procedural and
Constitutional Concerns
George A. Martinez
I. INTRODUCTION
Should a bankruptcy court's judgment bar further litigation of claims
arising out of the series of events at issue in the bankruptcy proceeding based
on the doctrine of res judicata? Or should res judicata apply only where the
subsequent action would constitute a core,' as opposed to non-core, but
related proceeding? These questions raise important procedural and
constitutional issues about which the courts of appeals are currently split.2

* AssociateProfessor of Law, Southern MethodistUniversity; B.A., 1976, Arizona
State University; M.A., 1979, The University of Michigan; J.D., 1985, Harvard Law
School. I would like to thank Professors Susan Block-Lieb, Timothy Davis, S.
Elizabeth Gibson and Marc Steinberg for commenting on an earlier version of this
article. Meloney Cargil, John Conway, Bill Davidoff, and Laura Hernandez provided
research assistance.
1. See infra notes 49-62 and accompanying text (explaining distinction between
core and non-core proceedings).
2. See Howell Hydrocarbons, Inc. v. Adams, 897 F.2d 183, 189 (5th Cir. 1990)
(decisions in bankruptcy courts act as a bar only to core proceedings); Barnett v. Stem,
909 F.2d 973, 979 (7th Cir. 1990) (same); Sure-Snap Corp. v. State Street Bank and
Trust Co., 948 F.2d 869, 873 (2d Cir. 1991) (whether or not a claim was a core
proceeding had no bearing on its preclusion); Sanders Confectionery Prod., Inc. v.
Heller Fin., Inc., 973 F.2d 474, 482 (6th Cir. 1992) (bankruptcy proceedings can also
be binding on non-core proceedings).
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This issue has arisen in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in3
Northern Pipeline Construction Company v. Marathon Pipe Line Company.
There, the Supreme Court held that the jurisdictional provision of the 1978
Bankruptcy Reform Act was unconstitutional because it impermissibly vested
Article III judicial powers in bankruptcy judges by authorizing them to decide
state common law actions without the parties' consent.4 The plurality opinion
in NorthernPipeline,however, recognized that non-Article III tribunals were
permitted to adjudicate cases involving "public rights."5 As to bankruptcy
matters, the plurality suggested that only "core proceedings" could involve
public rights allowing jurisdiction.6
In 1984, Congress responded to NorthernPipeline by enacting 28 U.S.C.
§ 157, which authorizes bankruptcy judges to hear all core proceedings arising
under the bankruptcy code.7 The 1984 Act provides that as to non-core
proceedings, bankruptcy judges may hear such proceedings but that they may
not enter a final order or judgment absent consent of the parties.8 As to such
proceedings, a bankruptcy judge may only make proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law to the district court." The distinction between core and
non-core matters is meant to ensure that bankruptcy courts will not encroach
impermissibly in the area reserved by the Constitution to Article III courts.
Despite this, the distinction between core and none-core proceedings has
generated a significant problem in the area of res judicata. As mentioned
above, the courts of appeals are currently split over the question of whether
a bankruptcy court's judgment bars further litigation of any claim that arises
out of the series of events at issue in the bankruptcy proceeding, including
non-core claims. There is a dearth of scholarship on this important issue.
Given this, this article seeks to resolve the conflict in the circuits and argues
that bankruptcy court judgments should not bar the assertion of non-core
claims because to do so violates the basic principles of res judicata and
3. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
4. See id at 87. Bankruptcy judges' positions were created under Article I of the
Constitution and did not possess the life tenure and guaranteed compensation
protections found in Article III. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 153, 154 (1982).
5. NorthernPipeline,458 U.S. at 68-70. See infranotes 24-25 and accompanying
text (explaining notion of public rights). For recent articles on non-Article III
legislative courts, see Daniel J. Meltzer, Legislative Courts,LegislativePower,and the
Constitution,65 IND. L.J. 291 (1990); Paul M. Bator, The ConstitutionasArchitecture:
Legislative and Administrative Courts Under Article 111, 65 IND. L.J. 233 (1990);
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., OfLegislative Courts,AdministrativeAgencies,andArticle III,
101 HARV. L. REV. 915 (1988).
6. NorthernPipeline, 458 U.S. at 71.
7. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) (1994).
8. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1) (1994).
9. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1) (1994).
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threatens to undermine fundamental Article III values or create judicial
inefficiencies in an effort to preserve such values.
Part II of the article provides the relevant Article III background, and
identifies the key Article III cases: NorthernPipeline Construction Company
v. Marathon Pipe Line Company"° and Commodity Futures Trading
Commission v. Schor."
This section explores the impact of Northern
Pipeline which held that the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act was
unconstitutional because it impermissibly gave Article III judicial powers to
bankruptcy judges. Describing the Congressional response to Northern
Pipeline, Part III explains the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship
Act of 1984. The next section examines the current split in the courts over
whether a bankruptcy court's judgment bars further litigation of any claim,
including non-core claims, that arises out of the transaction at issue. Finally,
part V seeks to resolve the split in the circuits by arguing that the general
principles of res judicata, concerns about fundamental Article III values and
judicial economy support the proposition that bankruptcy court judgments
should not bar non-core claims.
I. ARTICLE III AND THE BACKGROUND CASES:
NORTHERN PIPELINE AND SCHOR
A. The Policies Served By Article III
To understand the Article III issues at stake, it is important to consider
the policies behind Article III. Article III provides that the 'judicial power of
the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior
Courts, as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."' 2
Article III further directs that these federal courts shall be staffed by judges
who hold their offices during good behavior and receive a compensation
which shall not be diminished during their time in office. 3 The Good
Behavior Clause provides Article III judges with life tenure. 4
The
Compensation Clause grants Article III judges an irreducible salary.' 5 These
provisions serve both to protect the independence of the Judiciary from the

10. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
11. 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
12. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 1.
13. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
14. Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50,
59 (1982) (citing United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 16 (1955)).
15. NorthernPipeline,458 U.S. at 59 (citing United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200,
218-221 (1980)).

12
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control of the Executive and the Legislative Branches of government,16 and
the litigant's
right to have claims decided before judges who are free and
7
impartial.
Article III, then, was designed to maintain the checks and balances of the
constitutional structure, and also to guarantee impartial adjudication." Long
ago, Alexander Hamilton explained that Article III's provision for an
independent judiciary was also necessary in order to preserve the ideal of the
rule of law. 9
The Supreme Court has recognized that other purposes animate Article
III. Article III's provisions help to (1) promote public confidence in judicial

16. NorthernPipeline, 458 U.S. at 59.
17. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986)
(citing United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 218 (1980)). See also ERWIN
CHEMERISKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTON 181 (1989) (Article III protections were
"intended to insulate federal judges from direct political pressure and ensure that they
would uphold the Constitution and federal laws without regard to the popularity of
their actions."); MARTIN H. REDIsH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE
ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 53 (2d ed. 1990) ("The essential characteristic of the
Article III courts ...

is the independence their judges possess with respect to the

executive and legislative branches of the federal government. This independence is a
result of two specific requirements of Article III: first, judges of the courts created
pursuant to its provision have tenure during good behavior, and second, the salaries of
these judges cannot be reduced").
18. NorthernPipeline, 458 U.S. at 58. See also REDISH, supra note 17, at 53
("The business of the judiciary is often to review the constitutional legitimacy of the
actions of the legislative or executive branches. To the extent that these branches
retain power to retaliate against judges who displease them, it is at least conceivable
that courts will be unable to review the activities of those branches with proper
neutrality. It was for this very reason that the framers inserted the independence
requirements in Article III.").
19. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 489 (Alexander Hamilton) (H. Lodge ed. 1888):

Periodical appointments, however regulated or by whomsoever made, would
in some way or other, be fatal to [the court's] necessary independence. If
the power of making them was committed either to the executive or
legislature, there would be a danger of an improper complaisance to the
branch which possessed it; if to both, there would be an unwillingness to
hazard the displeasure of either; if to the people, or to persons chosen by
them for the special purpose, there would be too great a disposition to
consult popularity, to justify a reliance that nothing would be consulted but
the Constitution and the laws.
See also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative CourtsAdministrativeAgencies, and
Article 11, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915, 937 (1988) ("To subject federal judges to political
influence by Congress or the national executive would, [in the view of the framers],
have threatened the rule of law").
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determinations, (2) attract well qualified persons to the federal bench and (3)
insulate the individual judge from improper influences not only by other
branches but by colleagues as well, thereby promoting judicial
individualism.'
B. Northern Pipeline and Schor
1. The Northern Pipeline Decision
In the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Northern Pipeline,the
question arises whether bankruptcy court judgments will have res judicata
effect on non-core claims.2' In Northern Pipeline, the Supreme Court held
that the jurisdictional provisions of the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act (the
Reform Act) were unconstitutional because the Act impermissibly gave Article
III judicial powers to bankruptcy judges.' Authorized under Article I of the
Constitution, bankruptcy judges' positions do not possess the life tenure or
guaranteed salary protection given to Article III judges. Therefore, bankruptcy
judges cannot adjudicate a debtor's claims for breach of contract and breach
of warranty against a private company.' In a plurality opinion, the Northern
Pipeline Court recognized three exceptions to Article III's restriction of
judicial power to courts whose judges had its protections: (1) territorial
courts; (2) military courts and (3) "public rights" cases.24 Since bankruptcy
courts are not territorial courts or military courts, they could be upheld only
if their jurisdiction was limited to the determination of public rights.' As

20. See NorthernPipeline, 458 U.S. at 59 n.10.
21. Professor Chemerinsky has commented that "[w]ithout a doubt, the Northern

Pipeline case is the most important Supreme Court decision limiting the power of
Congress to create legislative courts." CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, at 202.
22. The 1978 Reform Act was designed to eliminate wasteful litigation by
providing bankruptcy courts with jurisdiction over all disputes that could affect the
debtor's bankruptcy.
See STEPHEN E. SNYDER & LAWRENCE PONOROFF,
COMMERCIAI BANKRUPrCY LMGATION 2, 3 (1992). Under this broad jurisdictional
grant, the bankruptcy court could decide debtor's claihs against third parties that were
based on state or federal non-bankruptcy law. Id.See also CHEMERINSKY, supranote
17, at 202 ("Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, bankruptcy judges appointed to
fourteen-year terms had broad jurisdiction to decide private civil disputes.").
23. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 76.
24. Id at 64-70. Public rights cases involve disputes "between the government and
others." Id at 69. On the other hand, private right cases involve "the liability of one
individual to another." Id at 69-70.
25. See REDISH, supranote 17, at 66 ("Under Justice Brennan's opinion, then, the
public-private right dichotomy serves as the standard for determining the division of
authority between Article III and Article I courts"). Commentators have questioned
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to bankruptcy proceedings, the plurality opinion suggested that only so called
"core proceedings" could involve public rights. The Court stated:
[Ihe restructuring of debtor-creditor relations, which is at the core of the
federal bankruptcy power, must be distinguished from the adjudication of
state-created private rights, such as the right to recover contract damages
that is at issue in this case. The former may well be a "public right," but
the latter obviously is not. 6
Thus, the Court concluded that because the bankruptcy courts had the
authority to decide state law private right claims, their jurisdiction went
beyond public right cases. According to the plurality, private right cases "lie
at the core of the historically recognized judicial power," and must be heard
by an Article III court.27 Given this, the constitutionality of the Reform Act
could not be sustained on the theory that bankruptcy courts fit within the
historical exceptions.28
The plurality also considered whether the constitutionality of the
bankruptcy courts could be upheld on the ground that such courts were
adjuncts of the district courts and subject to their control.29 Since the powers
of the bankruptcy courts were essentially as broad as that of the district court,
and the district court did not exercise sufficient control over the bankruptcy
court, the Court could not uphold the constitutionality of the bankruptcy courts
under the adjunct theory.30 Thus, in Northern Pipeline, the Supreme Court

whether the public-private right dichotomy is justified. See, e.g., REDISH, supranote
17, at 66. Professor Redish has argued that the use of the public-private right
dichotomy to determine the proper Article III-Article I division is contrary to the
policies and language of Article III. Id at 66-67.
26. NorthernPipeline, 458 U.S. at 71.

27. Id at 70.
28. See CHEMERINSKY, supranote 17, at 204 ("Justice Brennan's plurality opinion
stressed that legislative courts were permitted only in a few instances-for territories,
the military, and public rights disputes-and that bankruptcy did not fit into these
exceptions.").
29. In Crowellv.Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932), the Supreme Court held that Article
I courts could decide private right cases only if there was substantial oversight by an
Article III court. See CHEmERINSKY, supra note 17, at 198. In such situations, the

Article I courts are viewed as adjuncts to the Article III courts. See CHEMERINsKY,
supra note 17, at 199.
30. The plurality concluded that the bankruptcy courts were exercising power far
greater than had been approved in Crowellv.Benson. NorthernPipeline, 458 U.S. at
86. For further discussion of Northern Pipeline, see Martin H. Redish, Legislative
Courts,AdministrativeAgencies,and The Northern Pipeline Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J.
197 (1983). Professor Redish analyses the reasoning of Northern Pipeline and
provides two alternative methods for allocating judicial power between Article III and
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suggested that bankruptcy courts could adjudicate core proceedings because
they involve public rights. The Court, however, did not directly address the
question at issue-can bankruptcy judgments, consistent with Article III, bar
non-core (non-public right) claims?

2. The Schor Decision
To determine whether allowing bankruptcy judgments to bar non-core
claims is consistent with Article III, it is also necessary to consider the
Supreme Court's recent decision, Commodity Futures TradingCommission v.
Schor,3' concerning the use of Article I courts. Schor represented a shift
away from the plurality decision in Northern Pipeline.32 In Schor, the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) had promulgated a
regulation allowing it to adjudicate counterclaims arising "out of the
transaction or occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences set forth" in
a complaint filed with the CFTC alleging violation of the Commodity
Exchange Act.33 This permissive counterclaim rule allowed the respondent
to seek relief in other fora. Schor argued that Article III barred any
adjudication of state law counterclaims by the CFTC decisionmakers since
they did not enjoy the Article III salary and tenure protections. The court held
that the CFTC's assumption of jurisdiction over common law counterclaims
did not violate Article III."'
The Court stated that Article III serves both to protect "the role of the
independent judiciary within the constitutional scheme of tripartite
government" and "to safeguard litigants' rights to have claims decided before
judges who are free from potential domination by other branches of
government."35 As to the latter safeguard, the Court emphasized that "this
guarantee serves to protect primarily personal, rather than structural,

non-Article III bodies. See also Erwin Chemerinsky, Endingthe Marathon: It is Time
to OverruleNorthern Pipeline, 65 AM. BANKR. L. J. 311 (1991) (stating that Northern
Pipeline stands for the proposition that Congress may not vest in a non-Article III
court the power to adjudicate, render final judgment, and issue binding orders in a
traditional contract action arising under state law, without consent of the litigants, and
subject only to ordinary appellate review).
31. 478 U.S. 833 (1986). For analysis of Schor, see Richard B. Saphire & Michael
E. Solimine, Shoring Up Article II: Legislative CourtDoctrine in the Post CFTC v.
Schor Era, 68 B.U. L. REV. 85 (1988); Ralph U. Whitten, Consent, Caseload and
Other Justificationsfor Non-Article Ifl Courts and Judges: A Comment On
Commodity Futures Trading Commissionv. Schor, 20 CREIGHTON L. REv. 11 (1986).
32. See REDISH, supra note 17, at 77.

33. 17 C.F.R. § 12.23(b)(2) (1985).
34. Schor, 478 U.S. at 858.
35. Id at 848 (citing United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200 (1980)).
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interests. 3 6 In determining whether the CFTC's jurisdiction over state law
counterclaims violated Article III, the Court said that the congressional
interests in providing for administrative adjudication must7 be weighed against
the purposes underlying the requirements of Article III.

Applying these principles, the Court recognized that the Congressional
interest was to provide an inexpensive alternative to litigation in federal court
and to exploit the expertise of the CFTC.38 The Court weighed this interest
against the personal interest of the litigant in having a fair and independent
tribunal and the structural interest of preserving the role of the federal courts
in our tripartite scheme of government. 9 As to the litigant's interest in
fairness, the Court concluded that Schor waived his right to an independent
tribunal. When Schor asserted his counterclaim before the.CFTC, instead of
asserting the claim before a federal district court, the court determined that he
consented to CFTC's jurisdiction over the claim. Thus, Schor waived his
personal right to an Article III tribunal. As to the structural interest in
preserving our system of checks and balances, the court considered four
factors40 in determining whether the Congressional decision to authorize a
non-Article III tribunal impermissibly threatened the institutional integrity of
the Judicial Branch. After examining these factors, the Court concluded that
the congressional scheme did not intrude on the province of the judiciary.4
Regarding the question at issue, whether bankruptcy judgments should bar

36. Id
37. Id at 851.
38. Id at 855.

39. See id.at 857-58.
40. The court identified the factors to be considered as "the extent to which the
'essential attributes of judicial power' are reserved to Article III courts, and,
conversely, the extent to which the non-Article III forum exercises the range of
jurisdiction and powers normally vested only in Article III courts, the origins and
importance of the right to be adjudicated, and the concerns that drove Congress to
depart from the requirements of Article III." Id at 851.
41. Id at 857. The use of a balancing analysis has been criticized on the ground
that it "does not appear to be authorized by the language of Article III." REDISH,
supra note 17, at 71. In addition, the balancing analysis has been criticized for the
reason that any balancing analysis would invariably favor the legislative interest in
freeing the government from the constraints of Article III at the expense of the
constitutional values expressed in Article III. REDIsH, supra note 17, at 71-72. See
also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, at 212 ("the Court's balancing approach raises
concerns that Congress can eviscerate the jurisdiction of Article III courts by the slow
transfer of power on a case-by-case basis").
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non-core claims, Schor is particularly relevant. In Schor, the Court
emphasized that Article III provides litigants with a personal right to an
independent tribunal. As discussed in Part V, allowing bankruptcy court
judgments to bar non-core claims threatens to undermine a litigant's Article
III right to an independent tribunal or create judicial inefficiencies in an effort
to preserve that Article III right.42 Thus, the reasoning in Schor supports the
proposition that bankruptcy judgments should not bar non-core claims in order
to avoid Article III problems or judicial inefficiency.

III. CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE TO NORTHERN PIPELINE
In an effort to resolve the concerns of the Northern Pipeline Court,
Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of
1984."3 The bankruptcy jurisdiction scheme created by the 1984 Act has a
number of major features. First, the Act grants the district courts original and
exclusive jurisdiction over bankruptcy matters.' The Act also grants them
original, but non-exclusive, jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under,
arising in or related to the bankruptcy case.4"
Although district courts have jurisdiction over bankruptcy matters, they
rarely exercise that jurisdiction.' This is because the Act authorizes each
district court to refer all cases within the district court's section 1334(a) and
(b) jurisdiction to the non-Article III bankruptcy judges of the district.4 7 The

42. See infra notes 171-209 and accompanying text.
43. Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 344 (1984). The Northern Pipeline decision
"created serious and immediate problems for Congress by forcing it to restructure the
method of bankruptcy adjudication." REDISH, supranote 17, at 65. Prior to the 1984
Act, the Congress had adopted emergency rules in response to NorthernPipeline.For
example, see In re Grabill Corp., 967 F.2d 1152 (7th Cir. 1992). The Seventh Circuit
dealt with the issue of the authority of bankruptcy courts to conduct jury trials in core
proceedings. The court noted that subsequent to NorthernPipelinedecision, Congress
had twice declined to elevate the bankruptcy courts to Article III status. Id at 1157.
See also Vein Countryman, Scramblingto Define BanlauptcyJurisdiction: The Chief
Justice, the Judicial Conference, and the Legislative Process,22 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
1, 29-32 (1985) (referring to Congress' refusal to extend Article III status to
bankruptcy court judges).
44. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (1994).
45. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1994).
46. See SNYDER & PONOROFF, supra note 22, § 2.02, at 2-13.
47. 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) (1994). See also WILLIAM N. NORTON, JR., 1 NORTON
BANKRUPTCY LAw AND PRACTICE § 5.02 (1992) ("Under the 1984 system, the district

courts were granted power to retain and adjudicate all bankruptcy cases and
proceedings or refer them in whole or in part to the bankruptcy courts either by
specific orders of reference or by general orders of reference covering all present and
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district courts in each judicial district have now promulgated local rules
providing for automatic referral of all bankruptcy matters.48
Section 157(a) and (b) of the 1984 Act governs the bankruptcy court's
power over referred proceedings.4 9 Section 157(b)(1) authorizes bankruptcy
judges to hear and determine all bankruptcy cases, and all core proceedings
arising under the bankruptcy code or arising in a bankruptcy case." The
bankruptcy judge may enter final judgments in these cases."' Parties can
appeal such judgments to the district court. 2
Section 157(c)(1) provides that the bankruptcy judge may hear a
proceeding that is not a core proceeding but that is otherwise related to a
bankruptcy case. 3 The bankruptcy judge, however, cannot enter final
judgments in these non-core proceedings. 4 Instead, the bankruptcy judge is
to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district
court.55 After considering the bankruptcy judge's proposed findings and
conclusions and reviewing de novo those matters to which any party has
timely and specifically objected, the district judge then enters a final order.5 6
Section 157(c)(2) authorizes bankruptcy judges with the consent of all
parties, to enter final judgments in non-core proceedings. 7 Section 157 does
not define core or non-core proceedings. 8 Instead, Section 157(b)(2)
provides a non-exhaustive list of examples of core proceedings. 9 In general,
the examples constitute claims that are created by the Bankruptcy Code or that
relate to the administration of a bankruptcy case.'
In any event, the distinction between core and non-core proceedings is,
of course, designed to avoid Article III problems in allowing district courts to
future bankruptcy cases and proceedings").
48. See SNYDER & PONOROFF, supranote 22, at 2-16. See also NORTON, supra
note 47, § 5.02 ("Every federal District Court in each of the 106 federal districts opted
to issue a general order of reference of all present and future bankruptcy cases and
proceedings").
49. 28 U.S.C. § 157(a), (b) (1994).
50. See SNYDER & PONOROFF, supra note 22, at 2-16.
51. See SNYDER & PONOROFF, supra note 22, at 2-16.
52. See SNYDER & PONOROFF, supra note 22, at 2-16.
53. See SNYDER & PONOROFF, supra note 22, at 2-16.
54. See SNYDER & PONOROFF, supra note 22, at 2-16.

55. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1) (1994).
56. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1) (1994).
57. See SNYDER & PONOROFF, supra note 22, at 2-16.
58. See SNYDER & PONOROFF, supra note 22, at 2-17.
59. See NORTON, supra note 47, § 5.14 ("The Judicial Code, in 28 U.S.C.

§ 157(b)(2), sets forth a non inclusive list of 15 categories of bankruptcy proceedings
that are deemed to constitute 'core proceedings"').
60. See SNYDER & PONOROFF, supra note 22, at 2-17.
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refer bankruptcy matters to bankruptcy judges.6 It is still an open question,
however, as to whether this jurisdictional scheme meets the requirements of
Article III.62
IV. THE SPLIT IN THE COURTS OF APPEALS

In the wake of NorthernPipeline and the 1984 Act, courts of appeals are
divided over whether a bankruptcy court's judgment bars further litigation of
any claim, including a non-core claim, that arises out of the series of events
at issue. This section of the article discusses these cases.
A. Courts Taking the Position That Bankruptcy
Judgments Do Not Bar Non-Core Claims
One of the early cases to address the res judicata effect of bankruptcy
orders is Howell Hydrocarbons,Inc. v. Adamg.63 In Howell, Tomlinson Oil
Company (TOC), Tomlinson Refining Inc., and Pioneer Refining Ltd. filed for
reorganization under Chapter 11. Howell, a creditor, filed a proof of claim
in the proceeding.'
The bankruptcy court confirmed the reorganization
65
plan.
Subsequently, Howell filed a federal RICO claim in federal district court
against the shareholders of TOC alleging that they operated TOC and Pioneer
in a fraudulent manner. The district court entered summary judgment. The
court held that, based on the prior order of the bankruptcy court confirming
the reorganization plan, the doctrine of res judicata barred the RICO claim.6
The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that res judicata did not bar Howell's
RICO claim because the bankruptcy court would not have had jurisdiction
over it. The court stated that under 28 U.S.C. § 157, a bankruptcy court has
the power to "hear and determine all cases under Title 11 and all core
proceedings arising under Title 11, or arising in a case under Title 11V67
The court observed that a bankruptcy court may hear a non-core proceeding
and make proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district

61. See SNYDER & PONOROFF, supranote 22, at 2-18.
62. See

SNYDER

&

PONOROFF, supra

note 22, at 2-7.

For a survey of the

constitutional issues that have arisen under the 1984 Act, see Jeffrey T. Ferriell,
Constitutionality of the Bankruptcy Amendments and the FederalJudgeshipAct of

1984, 63 AM. BANKR. L. J. 109 (1989).
63. 897 F.2d 183, 189 (5th Cir. 1990).
64. Id at 187. Howell received all of the required notices.
65. Howell, 897 F.2d at 187.

66. Id at 187-88.
67. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) (1994).
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court, but it may not enter a final order of judgment.6 8 Thus, the court
concluded that the RICO claim should have been asserted in the bankruptcy
court only if Howell's claim would have constituted a core proceeding in the
earlier bankruptcy proceeding. 69 Since the RICO claim did not invoke a
substantive right provided by Title 11, it invoked a completely independent
federal right, and did not arise solely in the context of bankruptcy
proceedings. Therefore, the RICO claim was a non-core claim and could not
be barred by res judicata."
The Seventh Circuit addressed the same issue in Barnett v. Stern."' In
Barnett, Levit, the trustee of the Stern bankruptcy estate, initiated an adversary
proceeding in the bankruptcy court against the Nationwide Trust ("N.W.
Trust"). Levit alleged that the N.W. Trust was the alter ego of Burton, and
sought to have the bankruptcy court declare all the trust's assets property of
the bankruptcy estate. The bankruptcy court entered judgment for Levit.'2
Subsequently, Levit filed a RICO claim in the federal district court
alleging that Burton's son, Todd, violated RICO by using the N.W. Trust to
conceal assets. The district court held that res judicata barred Levit's RICO
claim because of the previous bankruptcy proceedings in which Levit sought
to have the N.W. Trust funds declared property of the estate."
Following the reasoning of Howell, the Seventh Circuit held that
previously unasserted claims could be barred by res judicata only if those
claims would have been core proceedings in the bankruptcy court.7 4
Applying this doctrine, the court reversed because the RICO claim would not
have been a core proceeding in the bankruptcy case." Thus, Levit was not
required to assert his RICO claim in the adversary proceeding.76
Howell Hydrocarbons and Barnett correctly concluded that bankruptcy
judgments should not bar non-core claims. Those decisions, however, do not
provide a comprehensive rationale for their decisions. Part V of this article
seeks to provide such a rationale.

68. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1) (1994).
69. Id at 190. The court noted that a "proceeding is core under Section 157 if it
invokes a substantive right provided by Title 11 or if it is a proceeding that, by its
nature, could arise only in the context of a bankruptcy proceeding." Id at 189-90.
70. Id at 190.
71. 909 F.2d 973 (7th Cir. 1990).
72. Id at 975.
73. Id at 976.
74. Id at 979.
75. Id. at 981-82.
76. Id.
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B. Courts Taking the Position That Bankruptcy
Judgments Bar Non-Core Claims
The Second Circuit addressed the question in Sure-Snap Corporationv.
State Street Bank and Trust Company." Sure-Snap entered into a loan
agreement with Bradford and State Street Bank & Trust Company. Later,
Sure-Snap filed for bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court entered an order
confirming a reorganization plan.78
Subsequently, Sure-Snap brought lender liability claims in federal district
court against Bradford and State Street Bank. The district court held that
principles of res judicata barred Sure-Snap's lender liability claims based on
the earlier bankruptcy order.79 Finding Sure-Snap's contention-that the
lender liability claims did not constitute core proceedings-had no bearing on
their preclusion, the Second Circuit affirmed.8" The court reasoned that
while 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) and § 1334(b) set out the general jurisdictional
parameters conferred on bankruptcy courts, they do not specify where the
actions should be brought.8"
The Sixth Circuit considered the issue in SandersConfectioneryProducts,
Inc. v. Heller Financial,Inc.82 In Sanders, FSI filed for bankruptcy. The
bankruptcy court issued an order confirming a bankruptcy plan of
reorganization. Subsequently, SCPI, Sanders, and Kreissl asserted lender
liability claims in federal district court.8 4 The district court dismissed all of
the claims as barred on res judicata grounds, because of the order issued in the
FSI bankruptcy. 85
On appeal, SCPI, Sanders, and Kreissl argued that their lender liability
claims were non-core proceedings, and therefore, the bankruptcy judgment
could not have been res judicata as to those claims. Rejecting the reasoning
of the Howell and Barnett courts, the Sixth Circuit held that in certain
circumstances decisions in bankruptcy cases can act as a bar to non-core
proceedings.86 The court reasoned that although the bankruptcy court would
not have subject matter jurisdiction over a non-core proceeding, the action
would still be within the district court's jurisdiction. The court said that while

77. 948 F.2d 869 (2d Cir. 1991).
78. Id at 870.
79. Id at 872.
80. Id. at 873.
81. Id
82. 973 F.2d 474 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1079 (1993).
83. Id at 480.
84. Id
85. Id
86. Id at 482.
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the bankruptcy court could not make a final decision in a non-core proceeding,
absent the consent of the parties, it could hear the matter and submit proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court. Through its
bankruptcy jurisdiction, the district court could decide the claim. Given this,
the court concluded that a bankruptcy court judgment could operate to bar
both core and non-core proceedings."
The Sure-Snap Corporation and Sanders courts' reasoning cannot
withstand scrutiny. First, the courts ignore the general res judicata principle
that provides that, when the jurisdiction of the first proceeding is limited, an
exception to the general rule against claim splitting is justified.88 The courts
also fail to take into account fundamental Article III concerns.89
V. RESOLUTION OF THE SPLIT IN THE CIRCUITS
This part of the article seeks to provide a comprehensive rationale to
resolve the split in the circuits. In particular, the article argues that
bankruptcy judgments should not bar non-core claims. To allow such
judgments to bar such claims would be contrary to general principles of res
judicata and threaten to undermine fundamental Article III values or create
judicial inefficiencies in an effort to preserve such values.
A. GeneralPrinciplesof Res Judicata
In order to resolve the split in the circuits, it is important to understand
the basic principles of res judicata. In general, federal law determines the
preclusive effect of federal judgments." Thus, federal rules of res judicata

87. Id at 483.
88. See infra notes 119-139 and accompanying text.
89. See infra notes 170-208 and accompanying text.
90. "It is clear that where the federal court decided a federal question, federal res
judicata rules govern." PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL

COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1604 (3d ed. 1988) (citing Deposit Bank v.
Frankfort, 191 U.S. 499 (1903) and Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165 (1938)). It is less
clear, however, what law governs the preclusion effect of federal diversity judgments.
See BATOR, supra this note, at 1604. Most courts and commentators, however, take
the position that federal law should determine the preclusive effect of all federal
judgments. See Kern v. Hettinger, 303 F.2d 333, 340 (2d Cir. 1962) ("[o]ne of the
strongest policies a court can have is that of determining the scope of its own
judgments.... It would be destructive of the basic principles of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure to say that the effect of a judgment of a federal court was governed
by the law of the state where the court sits simply because the source of federal
jurisdiction is diversity."); See generallyRonan E. Degnan, FederalizedResJudicata,
85 YALE L.J. 741 (1976).
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govern bankruptcy court judgments. 9' In addition, the federal law of res
judicata is almost entirely judge-made.92
Res judicata can be separated into two basic ideas: claim preclusion and
issue preclusion.93 These terms refer to two ways in which judgments may
preclude a future lawsuit. 4 As the Supreme Court has explained, the doctrine
of claim preclusion provides that when a final judgment has been entered by
a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits of a case, it concludes or
extinguishes the entire claim or cause of action in controversy. 95 This bar
precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could
have been raised in that action.96 Where the second action, however, is based
upon a different claim or cause of action, the prior judgment only operates to
preclude the relitigation of specific issues that were actually litigated in the
earlier action." Thus, in that situation, the prior judgment does not preclude
litigation of matters that might have been but actually were not litigated and
determined in the earlier action. 8 This latter type of preclusion is called
"issue preclusion."99
Central to the doctrine of claim preclusion is the notion of a claim."°
Courts do not agree on a single definition of a claim.'
The federal courts,
however, generally have adopted the modem transactional approach expressed
in the Restatement (Second) of Judgments. This approach defines a claim
broadly and provides that the claims extinguished by a first judgment
"includes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with
respect to all or any part of the transaction,
or series of connected transactions,
02
out of which the action arose."1

91. See Barnett v. Stem, 909 F.2d 973, 977 (7th Cir. 1990).
92. BATOR, supra note 90, at 1598.
93. See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 610-11 (2d ed. 1993).
94. See id. at 610.
95. See Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 129 (1983); Cromwell v. County
of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352-53 (1876).
96. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980); Nevada, 463 U.S. at 352-53.
97. See Cromwell, 94 U.S. at 352-353.
98. See FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 607 (4th ed. 1992).

99. See id. at 607-08.
100. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 93, at 662.
101. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 93, at 623.
102. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24(1) (1982). See Gene R.
Shreve, Preclusionand FederalChoice of Law, 64 TEX. L. REV. 1209, 1212 (1986)
("In more recent times, however, many lower federal courts have adopted the
expansive definition of a claim contained in the Restatement (Second) of Judgments,
and the Supreme Court has indicated that it may do the same"); Nevada v. United
States, 463 U.S. 110, 131 n.12 (1983) (praising the Second Restatement's approach to
the definition of a claim); Central States v. Plymouth Concrete, Inc., 803 F. Supp. 169,
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171 (N.D. Il1.1992) ("The Seventh Circuit has adopted the transactional approach of
the Restatement (Second) of Judgments in determining whether the cause of action in
the second suit is identical to that set forth in the first."). In determining which factual
groupings constitute a transaction, courts are to take a pragmatic approach, "giving
weight to such considerations as (1) whether the facts are related in time, space, origin
or motivation, (2) whether they form a convenient trial unit, and (3) whether their
treatment as a unit conforms to parties' expectations or business understanding or
usage." See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24(2) (1982). See also
Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Grounds, 931 F.2d 678, 683 (10th Cir. 1991) ("The
Restatement of Judgments defines 'transaction or series of transactions' pragmatically,
by looking at 'whether the facts are related in time, space, origin or motivation,
whether they form a convenient trend unit. . . ."'); see generally Harnett v. Billman,
800 F.2d 1308 (4th Cir. 1986).
The doctrine of claim preclusion promotes a number of policies. First, the
doctrine promotes the state's interest in bringing an end to litigation. See JAMES Er
AL., supra note 98, at 581.
See
Second, it protects parties against repetitive, vexatious litigation.
FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supranote 93, at 617. Thus, the most important purpose of res
judicata is to provide repose for both the parties and the public. See FRUEDENTHAL ET
AL., supra note 93, at 618. Third, principles of preclusion conserve scarce judicial
resources by preventing relitigation of the same dispute. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL.,
supranote 93, at 617. This is significant in light of the fact that commentators have
expressed concern that federal court dockets are overcrowded. See Paul D. Carrington,
Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: the Threat to the Function of Review
and the NationalLaw, 82 HARV. L. REV. 542 (1969); BATOR, supra note 90, at 43
(workload of federal courts "was approaching crisis proportions"). But see Edward W.
Cleary, Res JudicataReexamined, 57 YALE L.J. 339, 348-49 (1948) (arguing that
promoting judicial efficiency is an unconvincing justification for claim preclusion).
Fourth, the doctrine promotes reliance on judicial decisions and the stability of
judgments. Stability ofjudgments is important so that the moral force ofjudgments
is not undermined. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supranote 93, at 617-18. See JAMES
Er AL., supra note 98, at 581.
The Supreme Court has recently emphasized the importance of res judicata. In
Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394 (1981), the Court observed
FederatedDepartmentStores,
that "[the] doctrine of res judicata serves vital public interests beyond any individual
judge's ad hoc determination of the equities in a particular case," and that it is 'not a
mere matter of practice or procedure inherited from a more technical time than ours.'"
Id at 401. According to the Court, res judicata "is a rule of fundamental and
substantial justice, 'of public policy and of private peace,' which should be cordially
regarded and enforced by the courts." Id.(quoting Hart Steel Co. v. Railroad Supply
Co., 244 U.S. 294, 299 (1917)).
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B. Should Non-Core ProceedingsHave Been
Brought In the Bankruptcy Court?
In determining whether claim preclusion is appropriate, one must define
the breadth of the claim in the first law suit.' 3 The process of defining the
claim is aimed at defining the matters that might and should have been
advanced in the first litigation." As the Supreme Court has explained,
"[c]laim preclusion refers to the effect of a judgment in foreclosing litigation
of a matter that has never been litigated, because of a determination that it
should have been advanced in an earlier suit."" 5 Thus, a threshold issue is
whether non-core proceedings should have been brought in the bankruptcy
court.

1. Are Non-Core Claims Permissive?
Non-core claims are not claims that should have been brought in the
bankruptcy court because the language of the 1984 Act indicates that those
claims should be viewed as permissive or non-compulsory claims. In order
for claim preclusion to bar non-core claims, in effect, non-core claims must
be viewed as compulsory claims-i.e., litigants must assert them if they are
not to lose those claims. That interpretation, however, is inconsistent with the
permissive language of 28 U.S.C. § 157. Section 157(c)(1) provides that a
Given this
bankruptcy judge "may" hear non-core proceedings." 6
permissive language, non-core claims should not be viewed as claims that
must be asserted in the bankruptcy court on pain of being barred by res
judicata.
An analogous situation is presented in the context of cross-claims. Rule
13(g) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that co-parties "may"
assert cross-claims against one another that arise out of the transaction that is
the subject matter of the original action." 7 Focusing on the permissive

103. CHARLES A. WRIGHT Er AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4406,
at 45 (1981).
104. Id
105. Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 77 n.1 (1984)
(emphasis added).
106. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1) (1994) ("A bankruptcy judge may hear a
proceeding that is not a core proceeding but that is otherwise related to a case under

[Title 11.").

107. See FED. R. Civ. P. 13(g) ("A pleading may state as a cross-claim any claim
by one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim therein. ..
(emphasis added).
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language in Rule 13(g)-i.e., the term "may"-courts have concluded that
cross-claims are not compulsory and litigants are not barred from bringing the
claim in a subsequent action, even if that claim arose out of the same
transaction as the original action.'
In the same way, the permissive
language in 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1) should be read to mean that non-core
claims are permissive and should not be barred by res judicata even if they
arise out of the same transaction as the litigation before the bankruptcy court.
2. Are the Non-Core Proceedings Part of the Same "Transaction"?
In the alternative, non-core claims are not claims that should have been
brought in the bankruptcy court because core and non-core claims should not
be viewed for purposes of res judicata as arising out of the same transaction.
According to the modem approach, what factual groupings constitute a
transaction is to be determined pragmatically-one is to consider whether the
facts are related in time and space, form a convenient trial unit, and whether
their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties' expectations."°
Consideration of these factors supports finding that non-core and core claims
do not form part of the same transaction. First, there may be no substantial
factual overlap between core and non-core claims. Bankruptcy courts often
adjudicate claims that do not derive from a common nucleus of operative
fact."' Indeed, bankruptcy courts often decide claims that occurred months
or years apart."' The underlying events giving rise to the claims may be
totally unrelated."' Moreover, the parties to the claims may not be the
same." 3 For these reasons, some commentators have concluded that
bankruptcy jurisdiction can not be justified as a form of ancillary jurisdiction
since bankruptcy jurisdiction would fail the test established in United Mine

108. See American Sur. Co. v. Fazel, 20 F.R.D. 110, 111 (S.D. Iowa 1956) ("The
cross-claim in paragraph (g) is not compulsory, and the way is left open for a litigant
subsequently to make claim against a co-defendant ....

"); FREDENTHAL ET AL.,

supra note 93, at 358 ("Unlike transactionally related counterclaims in some
jurisdictions, cross-claims are totally permissive and may be asserted in the action at
the party's option or brought in a subsequent independent action."). See also Gallagher
v. Frye, 631 F.2d 127, 130 (9th Cir. 1980) ("This circuit has refused to apply res

judicata to bar a second suit on a claim related to an earlier claim when the second
claim could, but was not required, to have been joined in the first action.").
109. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 (1982).
110. See John T. Cross, CongressionalPower to Extend FederalJurisdictionto
Disputes OutsideArticle H1: A CriticalAnalysis from the Perspectiveof Bankruptcy,
87 Nw. U. L. REV. 1188, 1240 (1993).
111. See id
112. See id

113. See id
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Workers v. Gibbs... which provides that federal and nonfederal claims that

derive from a common nucleus of operative fact may be litigated as a single
case in federal court."' Second, it would not be convenient to try the
claims together. If litigants were forced to advance non-core claims in the
bankruptcy court, then in order to preserve their right to have those claims
meaningfully reviewed by an Article III court the non-core claims would have
to be considered de novo by the district court.1 6 This would be an
extremely inefficient result. Similarly, since bankruptcy courts cannot finally
determine such non-core claims absent a party's consent, litigants would not
expect that such non-core claims would be treated as a trial unit with core
claims. For these reasons, non-core and core claims should not be considered
to have arisen from the same transaction. 7 Non-core claims arise out of
a different transaction from the core claims, and therefore, they constitute
different claims for purposes of claim preclusion. This is consistent with the
Restatement's position that "limitations on [the] authority of the tribunal
should carry corresponding limitations on the scope of 'claim' for purposes
of the rule of claim preclusion.""' Therefore, bankruptcy court judgments
should not bar non-core claims.
C. Limitations of FirstProceedings
The bankruptcy court is a court of limited jurisdiction. It has no
jurisdiction to decide non-core claims with finality, absent consent by the
parties." 9 This fact is significant. Limitations on the jurisdiction of a first
court may justify a relaxation of the general requirement that all parts of a
single claim be advanced. 20 Indeed, a basic principle of res judicata states
that the doctrine of claim preclusion does not apply where the jurisdiction of

114. 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
115. See Cross, supra note 110, at 1241.
116. See infra notes 170-209 and accompanying text.
117. See STEPHEN C.YEAZELL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 897 (3d ed. 1992)

(where there are reasons not to try all claims in a single suit, "it casts some doubt on
whether the ... claims should be treated as one for [claim] preclusion purposes").
118. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 83 cmt. g, at 276 (1982). See

also Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Jackson, 862 F.2d 491, 502 (5th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied,490 U.S. 1035 (1989).
119. See Howell Hydrocarbons, Inc. v. Adams, 897 F.2d 183, 189 (5th Cir. 1990)
(bankruptcy court had no jurisdiction over the non-core claims); Sanders Confectionery
Prod., Inc. v. Heller Fin., Inc., 973 F.2d 474, 483 (6th Cir. 1992) (bankruptcy court
has no subject matter jurisdiction over non-core claims).
120. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 103, § 4407, at 48-64.

M
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the first court was limited in that it could not give the party complete
relief.'2 ' Accordingly, this section of the article argues that bankruptcy
judgments should not bar non-core claims because that would be contrary to
this basic principle.
1. The Restatement Approach
Because federal courts have often followed the approach of the
Restatement, it is helpful to consider it." Section 24 of the Restatement
sets out the general rule of claim preclusion and, in essence, provides that a
final judgment extinguishes all claims arising out of the same operative
nucleus of fact." Section 26 of the Restatement, however, qualifies this
general rule. Section 26(l)(c) provides that the general rule of Section 24
does not apply to extinguish a claim where the plaintiff was unable to rely on
a certain theory of the case or obtain complete relief in the first action because
of the limitation on the subject matter jurisdiction of the courts or restrictions
on their authority to entertain multiple theories. 24 Significantly, the
Supreme Court quoted this provision of the Restatement with approval in
Marrese v. American Academy of OrthopaedicSurgeons."z

§ 26, at 233-34 (1982).
122. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
123. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24(1) (1982) ("When a valid
and final judgment rendered in an action extinguishes the plaintiff's claim pursuant to
the rule of merger or bar, ... the claim extinguished includes all rights of the plaintiff
to remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or
series of connected transactions, out of which the action arose.").
124. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26(1)(c) (1982) which
121. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS

provides that the general rule of claim preclusion does not apply where:
the plaintiff was unable to rely on a certain theory of the case or to seek a
certain remedy or form of relief in the first action because of the limitations
on the subject matter jurisdiction of the courts or restrictions on their
authority to entertain multiple theories or demands for multiple remedies or
forms of relief in a single action, and the plaintiff desires in the second
action to rely on that theory or to seek that remedy or form of relief.
125. 470 U.S. 373, 382 (1985) (noting that claim preclusion generally does not

apply where "the plaintiff was unable to rely on a certain theory of the case or to seek
a certain remedy because of the limitations on the subject matter jurisdiction of the

courts") (quoting

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS

§ 26(l)(c) (1982)). The

lower federal courts also have followed the Restatement in holding that claim
preclusion does not apply where the first court's jurisdiction was limited. See, e.g.,
Texas Employers Ins. Ass'nv. Jackson, 862 F.2d 491, 502 (5th Cir. 1988) ("Thus, this
case fits into a well recognized exception to claim preclusion, as provided in
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 26(1)(c), for instances where the relief sought
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Comment g to Section 24 explains that the Section 26 exception to the
general rule against claim splitting where the first court is one of limited
jurisdiction, is sometimes not available. The exception is not available where
the first court has no jurisdiction to give an award for more than a designated
amount; however, a court of general jurisdiction was available to the plaintiff
in the same system of courts in which the plaintiff could have obtained
complete relief.'26 When the plaintiff brings an action in such a court and
recovers judgment for the maximum amount which the court can award, the
plaintiff is precluded from thereafter maintaining an action to the balance of
his claim.
The comment justifies this result by emphasizing the plaintiff's
voluntary action: "The plaintiff, having voluntarily brought his action in a
court which can grant him only limited relief, cannot insist upon maintaining
another action on the claim."'' 2
Comment c to Section 26 of the Restatement further explains when an
exception based on the limited jurisdiction of the first court is available.
Comment c states that the general rule of Section 24 is based on the
assumption that the jurisdiction in which the first judgment was rendered was
one which placed no formal barriers in the way of the litigants presenting to
a court in one action the entire claim. 29
or theory advanced in the first suit is cognizable only before a court of limited
jurisdiction not competent to act on the theory advanced or relief sought in the second
suit."); Washam v. J.C. Penney Co., 519 F. Supp. 554, 558-59 (D. Del. 1981) ("The
settled principles of res judicata, as articulated in the proposed RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, limit the general rule preventing splitting of claims...

'[w]hen ... the plaintiff was unable to rely on a certain theory of the case or to seek
a certain remedy or form of relief in the first action because of the limitations on the
subject matter jurisdiction of the courts."') (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS (Tentative Draft No. 5) § 61.2(1) (1978)); Green v. Illinois Dept. of
Transp., 609 F. Supp. 1021, 1025-26 (N.D. Ill. 1985) ("claim preclusion does not
apply where limitations on first court's jurisdiction prevented litigation of theory or
availability of remedy") (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JuDGmENTrs § 26(1)(c)
(1982)).
126. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 cmt. g (1982). See also
Douglass G. Boshkoff, Bankruptcy in the Seventh Circuit: 1989-1990, 24 IND. L.
REV. 551, 564 (1991) (recognizing the importance of determining the applicability of
the Restatement's Section 26 exception to the general rule against claim splitting where
the first court is one of limited jurisdiction in analyzing the res judicata effect of
bankruptcy court judgments).
127. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 cmt. g (1982).
128. Id
129. See id Section 26 cmt. c reads:
The generalrule of Section 24 is largelypredicatedon the assumption that
the jurisdictionin which thefirstjudgment was renderedwasone which put
no formal barriersin the way of a litigants' presentingto a court in one
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Given this, a question arises as to whether formal barriers existed with
respect to presenting all of plaintiff s claims initially in the district court-the
court of greater jurisdiction-as opposed to the bankruptcy court. Such
formal barriers existed; thus, litigants should be entitled to take advantage of
the exception to the general rule against claim splitting where the initial action
is brought in a court of limited jurisdiction. The district courts have original
and exclusive jurisdiction over all bankruptcy cases.'
Each district court
is authorized to refer cases within the district court's 1334(a) & (b)
jurisdiction to the bankruptcy judges of the district.'
Indeed, the district
courts in each judicial district have since promulgated local rules providing for
automatic referral of all bankruptcy matters to the bankruptcy judges of the
district.'32 Once the cases are referred to the bankruptcy court, a district
court may withdraw in whole or in part, any case that previously was referred
to the bankruptcy court, on motion of any party, for cause shown.'
Thus,
a district court has discretion to refuse to withdraw most cases., 4 Given
this, a party has no absolute right to present all claims initially in the court of
greater jurisdiction-the district court.'35
Under these circumstances, parties can not fairly be said to have chosen
voluntarily to litigate their claims initially in bankruptcy court as opposed to
a court of greater jurisdiction-the district court. Formal barriers exist
preventing a bankruptcy litigant's presentation of the entire claim to a court
of greater jurisdiction in one action. Thus, parties litigating in bankruptcy
courts should be entitled to rely on the general exception to the claim splitting
rule expressed in Section 26 of the Restatement governing cases where the
"plaintiff was unable to rely on a certain theory of the case... in the first

action the entire claim including any theories of recovery or demands for
relief that might have been available to him under applicable law. When
such formal barriers in fact existed and were operative against a plaintiff in
the first action, it is unfair to preclude him from a second action in which
he presents those phases of the claim which he was disabled from
presenting in the first
(emphasis added). See also Boshkoff, supra note 126, at 565.
130. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a),(b) (1994).
131. 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) (1994).
132. See NORTON, supranote 47, § 5.02 ("Every federal district court in each of
the 106 federal districts opted to issue a general order of reference of all present and
future bankruptcy cases.").
133. 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) (1994).
134. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) (1994).
135. For example, in In re Auto, 134 B.R. 188 (1990), the court held that it was
not required to withdraw its reference of a RICO claim to bankruptcy court.
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action because
of the limitation on the subject matter jurisdiction of the
, 36
courts."

The fact that a litigant could have asserted non-core claims in the
bankruptcy court with that court in turn submitting proposed findings of fact
and conclusions of law to the district court does not require a contrary
conclusion. The doctrine of claim preclusion bars claims that "could have
been raised" in a prior action.'37 The ability to assert non-core claims in the
bankruptcy court, however, should not be interpreted to mean that such claims
"could have been raised" in that tribunal so as to raise the bar of res judicata.
In order to meet the doctrinal requirement of "could have been raised," the
first forum must have had subject matter jurisdiction over the claim. 38
Since the bankruptcy court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over noncore claims absent a party's consent," such claims "could not have been
raised" inthe bankruptcy courtwithin the meaning of the doctrine ofresjudicata.

136. In re Auto, 134 B.R. at 233. The argument that litigants should not be
viewed as having voluntarily chosen to litigate in the bankruptcy courts finds support
in the analogous situation where the issue is whether a prior state court judgment
should be given claim preclusive effect so as to bar the assertion of a claim within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts-e.g., an antitrust claim. Some argue that
state court judgments should bar such federal claims where the federal court plaintiff
chose the forum in the initial state court action-i.e., they were the plaintiff in the

earlier state court action and selected a forum that could give only partial relief. See,
e.g., Note, Res Judicata: Exclusive FederalJurisdictionand the Effect of PriorStateCourt Determinations,53 VA. L. REV. 1360, 1365 (1967). On the other hand,
according to some commentators, a defendant in the earlier state court action should
not be viewed as having chosen that forum even though, if the defendant could have
removed the case to federal court, he could be said to have chosen the forum. See id
at 1365 n.25. They argue that defendants can not be said to have freely chosen the
forum because "a defendant in a state court may be able to remove in only very
limited circumstances." Id, Even if he can remove, "[r]emoval in such a case may not
be the full 'choice' that the plaintiff may have had when he initiated the suit." Id at
1366 n.25. Under these circumstances, claim preclusion should not bar the assertion
of a claim within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal court. See id In the same
way, as discussed, a bankruptcy court litigant has not freely chosen the initial

bankruptcy court forum and cannot freely remove the case to the court of greater
jurisdiction-the district court. Thus, the doctrine of claim preclusion should not bar
the non-core claim.
137. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
138. See David J. Schulte, Comment, The Claim PreclusiveEffect of State Court
Judgments on Federal Antitrust Claims: Marrese v. American Academy of
Orthopaedic Surgeons, 71 IOWA L. REV. 609, 617 (1986).
139. See Sanders Confectionery Prod., Inc. v. Heller Fin., Inc., 973 F.2d 474, 483
(6th Cir. 1992) (bankruptcy court would not have subject matter jurisdiction over a

non-core related proceeding).
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2. The Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction Analogy
An analogous situation is presented where state court adjudication is
followed by an action brought in the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal court.
For example, antitrust and securities actions fall within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the federal courts.14 ° In these cases, an important issue is
whether cases brought in exclusive federal jurisdiction should be immune from
the preclusive effects of state courtjudgments. 4 ' Because the rules that courts
have developed in this analogous context are instructive as to what rule should
be adopted in the bankruptcy court context, an analysis of these cases is
required. As discussed below, these analogous cases support the proposition
that bankruptcy court judgments should not bar non-core claims.
a. The Marrese Case
The Supreme Court recently considered this issue in Marresev. American
Academy of OrthopaedicSurgeons.4 ' It is worth considering the opinion in
some detail. In Marrese,two board-certified orthopaedic surgeons applied for
membership in the American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons (the
Academy). The Academy denied their membership applications. The
surgeons filed separate suits in Illinois state courts, alleging violations of
Illinois common law. Neither surgeon alleged a violation of state antitrust law
or filed a federal antitrust suit. The Illinois courts ruled against both surgeons.
Subsequently, the surgeons filed a federal antitrust suit in federal district
court, based on the same events underlying their state court actions. The
Academy filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that, based on the earlier state
court judgments, the doctrine of claim preclusion barred the federal antitrust
suit. The court reasoned that state courts lack jurisdiction over federal
antitrust claims, and therefore, a state court judgment could not have a claim
preclusive effect in a subsequent federal antitrust suit.'43 The Seventh

140. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26 (1994) (antitrust); 15 U.S.C. § 78(a) (1994)
(securities).
141. See, e.g., Note, Res Judicata: Exclusive FederalJurisdictionand the Effect
ofPriorState-CourtDeterminations,supranote 136, at 1360; Note, The Res Judicata
and CollateralEstoppelEffect ofPriorState Suits on Actions UnderSEC Rule 10b-5,
69 YALE L.J. 606 (1960); Note, The Effect of Prior Nonfederal Proceedings on
Exclusive FederalJurisdictionover Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 46 N.Y.U. L. REV. 936 (1971).
142. 470 U.S. 373 (1985). For an analysis of the Supreme Court's decision in
Marresev. AmericanAcademy of OrthopaedicSurgeons, see Shreve, supra note 102,
at 1222.
143. Marrese, 470 U.S. at 376.
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Circuit reversed, holding that claim preclusion barred the federal antitrust
14
suit.
The Supreme Court reversed. 45 At issue was whether a state court
judgment could have preclusive effect on a federal antitrust claim that could
not have been raised in the state court action because federal antitrust claims
are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts. While not directly
deciding whether preclusion should apply in this case, the Supreme Court
found that the Seventh Circuit erred by suggesting that a federal court should
determine the preclusive effect of a state court judgment without regard to the
law of the state in which the judgment was rendered. 4 6 The Court held that
the preclusive effect of a state court judgment in a subsequent federal lawsuit
generally is determined by the full faith and credit statute. The statute
provides that state judicial proceedings "shall have the same full faith and
credit in every state within the United States."' 47 The Court stated that
Section 1738 directs a federal court to the preclusion law of the state iri
which
the judgment was rendered in order to determine the preclusive effect of a
state judgment.4' The Court, however, left open the possibility that there
might be express or implied exceptions to § 1738," and that the Due
Process Clause might require a different result than that provided by the state
preclusion law.'5 °

144. Id at 377.
145. Id. at 378.
146. Id. at 380.
147. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994). See also Shreve, supra note 102, at 1223 (The
Marrese Court stated "that section 1738 requires a federal court considering the
preclusive effect of a state judgment to begin its inquiry by examining state preclusion
law. The circuit court erred in disregarding Illinois state law.").
148. Marrese,470 U.S. at 380.
149. Id. at 381. See also Shreve, supranote 102, at 1224 ("Congress did not have
to enact the original full faith and credit statute, and ... it is free either to repeal it
or to lighten its obligations by amending it to create exceptions.").
150. Marrese,470 U.S. at 380. Applying these principles, the Court noted that
with respect to matters that were not decided in the state proceedings, claim preclusion
generally does not apply where "[tihe plaintiff was unable to rely on a certain theory
of the case or to seek a certain remedy because of the limitations on the subject matter
jurisdiction of the courts." Id.at 382 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JuDGMENTs § 26(1)(c) (1982)). The Court stated that if the relevant state preclusion
law includes this requirement ofjurisdictional competency, a state judgment will not
have claim preclusive effect on a cause of action within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the federal courts. Id. at 382. The Court observed that the issue of whether there is
an exception to section 1738 arises only if state law indicates that litigation of a
particular claim should be barred in the later federal action. Id at 383. The Court
considered Chief Justice Burger's suggestion in a separate opinion that a federal rule
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Marreseis an important opinion. It is, however, distinguishable from the
bankruptcy situation. In the bankruptcy context, there is no problem of
comity and deference to state law principles of preclusion. The preclusive
effect of bankruptcy judgments is a function of federal law.'
Marrese,
then, does not directly address what the federal rule should be in this
instance. 5 In considering what the federal rule should be in the bankruptcy
context, it is worth examining what federal res judicata rules were formulated
prior to Marrese where a state court judgment is followed by an action
brought in the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts.

b. The FederalLaw Priorto Marrese
In this connection, a leading case is the Second Circuit's decision in
Lyons v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation.' Westinghouse sued Lyons
in state court, alleging breach of contract. Lyons pleaded an affrmative
defense based on federal antitrust laws. After a trial, the state court ruled
against Lyons.15

Subsequently, Lyons sued Westinghouse in the federal district court,
alleging federal antitrust claims, based on the same facts as the state court
proceeding. On appeal, the issue was whether the doctrine of claim preclusion

should be crafted reflecting the general preclusion principle that the judgment of a
court of limited jurisdiction concludes the claim where the plaintiff might have
commenced his action in a court of greater jurisdiction that was competent to give full
relief. See id at 383 n.3. The Court also acknowledged that the Seventh Circuit's
decision approximated such a rule because it encouraged plaintiffs to file suit initially
in federal district court and to attempt to bring any state law claims as pendent claims
to their federal antitrust claims. The Court observed that "[ijf we had a single system
of courts and our only concerns were efficiency and finality, it might be desirable to
fashion claim preclusion rules that would require a plaintiffto bring suit initially in the
forum of most general jurisdiction.. ." Id at 385. The Court, however, rejected that
approach because it ignored important concerns of comity reflected in section 1738
which generally allow states to determine the preclusive effect of their own courts'
judgments. Id
151. See supranote 91 and accompanying text.
152. See also Boshkoff, supranote 126, at 566 (recognizing that Marresedoes not
provide an answer to the'question of the res judicata effect of bankruptcy court
judgments).
153. 222 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1955). See Note, Res Judicata: Exclusive Federal
Jurisdictionand the Effect of PriorState-CourtDeterminations,supra note 136, at
1364 ("A discussion of the cases in which the state-court defendant is a plaintiff in
federal court or an exclusively federal claim must focus initially on Lyons v.
Westinghouse Electric Corp.").
154. Lyons, 222 F.2d at 185.
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barred assertion of the federal antitrust claims based on the earlier state court
judgment, even though federal courts had exclusive jurisdiction to hear federal
antitrust claims. Judge Learned Hand, writing for the Second Circuit, held
that the grant to the district courts of exclusive jurisdiction over antitrust
actions "should be taken to imply an immunity of their decisions from any
prejudgment elsewhere; at least on occasions, like those at bar, where the
putative estoppel includes the whole nexus of facts that makes up the
wrong."'5 5 The court reasoned that one of the purposes of exclusive
jurisdiction was to promote the uniform administration of the federal antitrust
laws. 6 The court concluded that it could best promote such uniformity "by
an untrammeled jurisdiction of the federal courts."'5 7 According to the
Second Circuit, the "delay and expense of a double trial of the same issue" did
not outweigh the policy of promoting a uniform federal antitrust law as
expressed in the exclusive federal jurisdiction statute.'
In Lyons, the plaintiff in the federal action was the defendant in the prior
state court litigation. Thus, some commentators argued that the Lyons
decision which held that claim preclusion should not bar the federal antitrust
claim, could be partially explained on the ground that the defendant in the
state action did not choose a forum that could only give partial relief.5 9
The Second Circuit, however, later made clear that claim preclusion
would not bar the federal antitrust claim even where the federal plaintiff had
also been the plaintiff in state court. In InternationalRailways of Central
America v. UnitedFruit Company,'6° stockholders of International Railways
of Central America sued United Fruit in state court alleging certain state law
of International Railways. The
claims arising out of United Fruit's acquisition
6'
court.'
state
the
in
lost
stockholders
Later, International Railways filed a suit in federal court alleging antitrust
violations based on the same facts underlying the state court suit. Relying
heavily on the fact that the plaintiff had chosen the earlier state court which

155. Id at 189.
156. See id
157. Id See also Note, Res Judicata: Exclusive FederalJurisdictionand the
note 136, at 1365 (The Lyons court's
Effect ofPriorState-CourtDeterminations,supra
conclusion "promotes uniform application of the antitrust laws by leaving federal
jurisdiction 'untrammeled."').
158. Lyons, 222 F.2d at 190.
159. See, e.g., Note, Res Judicata: Exclusive FederalJurisdictionand the Effect
of PriorState-CourtDeterminations,supranote 136, at 1365 ("Another, though less
obvious, justification for the [Lyons] court's opinion is that Lyons, as defendant in the
state action, had not had the choice of forum.").
160. 373 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,387 U.S. 921 (1967).
161. Id at 409.
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could give him only partial relief, the district court held that claim preclusion
barred the antitrust claims.1 62 The Second Circuit reversed, holding that
even where the plaintiff had selected the initial state court forum, the prior
state court judgment should not bar a claim within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the federal courts. 63
Lyons and UnitedFruitstood for the proposition, prior to Marrese,that
state court judgments should not bar claims within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the federal courts. According to those courts, the reason for such a rule is
to promote the uniformity of federal law.
On the other hand, the basic argument in favor of allowing a state court
judgment to bar the assertion of a claim within the exclusive federal
jurisdiction "is that a claimant who could have taken both state and federal
theories to federal court should be precluded by the choice to advance only a
state theory in the state court."' 64 This rule promotes judicial efficiency and
the protection of the defendant.'65
Although some courts'" and
commentators'6 7 took such a position, the weight of authority rejected the
view that a state court judgment should bar the assertion of a claim within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts. 6

162. International Ry. of Central America v. United Fruit Co., 254 F. Supp. 233,
236-37 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
163. 373 F.2d at 418. See also Note, Res Judicata: Exclusive Federal
Jurisdictionand the Effect of PriorState-Court Determinations, supra note 136, at

1380 (The United Fruit case "not only ignores, but also condemns, any distinction
between a case where the federal plaintiff has earlier exercised the choice offorum and
where he has not.").
164. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 103, § 4470.
165. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 103, § 4470.
166. E.g., Nash County Bd. of Educ. v. Biltmore Co., 640 F.2d 484 (4th Cir.
1981).
167. E.g., Note, The Res Judicataand CollateralEstoppel Effect of PriorState
Suits on Actions Under SEC Rule 10b-5, supra note 141, at 606.
168. See, e.g., WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 103, at 688 ("On balance it seems better
to reject claim preclusion"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26, cmt. c and

illus. 2 (1982); id. § 26, Reporter's Note to cmt. c ("when the plaintiff, after having
lost a state action, seeks relief with respect to the same transaction under a federal
statute enforceable only in federal court, it may be argued that he should be held
barred especially if he could have instituted his original suit in federal court where
both federal and state grounds could have been considered, and more especially if the
applicable state law was very similar to the federal. It appears sounder, however, not
to preclude the federal action by the doctrine of bar."); Cream Top Creamery v. Dean
Milk Co., 383 F.2d 358 (6th Cir. 1967); Seagoing Uniform Corp. v. Texaco, Inc., 705
F. Supp. 918, 921 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("If because ofjurisdictional restrictions a plaintiff
is unable to assert his claim in its entirety in a prior proceeding, the general rule
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Given the reasoning in these analogous cases, the argument against claim
preclusion in the bankruptcy context seems at least as strong as in the
exclusive federal jurisdiction context. Article III values are central to our
constitutional scheme of government.' 69 Indeed, Article III is crucial to
70
preserving the fundamental ideal of the rule of law in American society.
The policies of Article III, then, seem at least as important as the policies
promoted by exclusive federal jurisdiction-e.g., uniformity of federal law.
Thus, if claim preclusion should not be allowed in order to protect exclusive
federal jurisdiction, then claim preclusion should not be allowed to undermine
Article III jurisdiction. Thus, just as the grant of exclusive federal jurisdiction
to the federal district courts should be taken to mean that their decisions are
immune from prejudgment, the Article III grant of jurisdiction to the federal
district courts should be taken to mean that their decisions regarding non-core
claims are immune from prejudgment by the bankruptcy courts, where the
litigants have not consented to such bankruptcy court jurisdiction. Thus,
bankruptcy court judgments should not bar non-core claims.
D. Principlesof Preclusion,the Preservationof Article IU
Values and the Promotion of JudicialEfficiency
If principles of res judicata are applied to bankruptcy court judgments,
Article III values may be undermined or judicial economy may be undermined
in an effort to preserve such values. Parties would be required to raise their
non-core claims in the bankruptcy courts on pain of having the doctrine of
claim preclusion bar those claims. Bankruptcy courts may hear such non-core
proceedings, but they may not enter a final order or judgment, absent the
party's consent.'
In such a situation bankruptcy courts may only follow
a recommended disposition procedure. 7 2 Thus, they may hear such claims
and propose findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court' 73

against claim splitting will not be applicable against him."); Wellington Computer
Graphics, Inc. v. Modell, 315 F. Supp. 24,26 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) ("Since the New Jersey
Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim under Section 10(b) and
Rule 10(b)(5), a final judgment there could not have res judicata effect here."); Kaham
v. Rosensteil, 285 F. Supp. 61, 63 (D. Del. 1968).
169. See supra notes 12-20 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 12-20 and accompanying text.
171. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1) (1994).
172. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1) (1994).
173. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1) (1994).
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1. The Problem of De Facto Adjudication,
Meaningful Review and Judicial Economy
Such potentially dispositive bankruptcy recommendations raise potential
Article III problems or problems of judicial efficiency. Schor has made clear
that litigants have a personal Article III right to a fair and independent
tribunal.
That right is threatened by potentially dispositive bankruptcy
recommendations inasmuch as they raise the specter of de facto bankruptcy
court adjudication of non-core proceedings. 7
There are a number of
analogous cases dealing with the delegation of duties to magistrates that are
instructive on this point.'
For example, in Wingo v. Wedding' the
Supreme Court held that both the Federal Habeas Corpus statute' and the
1968 Magistrates Act 79 restricted habeas corpus evidentiary hearings to
district judges. 8 Magistrates, non-Article III judges, could not hear such
proceedings and then make recommendations to the district court judge.'
In part, the Court reached this conclusion because the recommended
disposition procedure would inevitably result in the risk of de facto magistrate
adjudication since the habeas petitions turned largely on factual determinations
that are highly dependent on evaluations of witness credibility.' The Court
concluded that even judicial review of recorded testimony may be unable to
guarantee that such habeas petitions would always receive judicial, rather than
magistrate determination.' 83

174. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986)
("Article III, § 1 serves ...
to safeguard litigants' 'right to have claims decided before
judges who are free from potential domination by other branches of government."').
175. Cf.Reinier H. Kraakman, Article 11N Restraints and the Expanding Civil
Jurisdiction of Federal Magistrates: A Dissenting View, 88 YALE L.J. 1023, 1041-

1047 (1979) (arguing that magistrates' recommended disposition of proceedings
presents constitutional problems because of the risk of de facto magistrate
adjudication).
176. Magistrates are non-Article III judges in that they lack the Article III
protections. See 28 U.S.C. § 631(e) (1994). For example, magistrates are appointed
for terms of eight years. See 28 U.S.C. § 631(e) (1994). In certain proceedings,
magistrates are authorized to conduct hearings and propose findings of fact and
conclusions of law to the district court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (1994).
177. 418 U.S. 461 (1974).
178. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1976).
179. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1970).
180.
181.
182.
183.

Wingo, 418 U.S. at 472; See Kraakman,supra note 175, at 1041.
Wingo, 418 U.S. at 472.
Id at 468, 474; see Kraakman, supra note 175, at 1043.
Wingo, 418 U.S. at 465-66; see Kraakman, supra note 175, at 1043.
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Subsequently, in United States v. Raddatz," the Supreme Court
suggested that delegation of Article III powers to a magistrate is permissible
only if the ultimate determinations on the merits of delegated matters are made
by the district judge. 8 In Raddatz, the district court referred a pretrial
motion to suppress evidence to a magistrate. The magistrate recommended
that the motion to suppress be denied. In response, the defendant argued that
the Federal Magistrates Act and Article III required the district court to rehear
the testimony on which the magistrate's findings and recommendations were
based in order to make an independent evaluation of credibility.
In addressing the defendant's Article III argument, the Court emphasized
the difference between pretrial and trial proceedings, stating that "the interests
at stake in a suppression hearing are of lesser magnitude than those in the
criminal trial itself."8 6 The Court also noted that a "defendant who has not
prevailed at the suppression hearing remains free to present evidence and
argue to-and may persuade-thejury that the confession was not reliable and
therefore should be disregarded."18 Under these circumstances, the Court
found that Article III did not require the district judge to rehear the evidence
on which the magistrate based his findings. The Court stated that "[a]lthough
the [Federal Magistrates Act] permits the district court to give the magistrates
proposed findings of fact and recommendations such weight as their merit
commands and the sound discretion of the judge warrants, that delegation does
not violate Article III so long as the ultimate decision is made by the district
court."88 Thus, Raddatz identified that the availability of meaningful
judicial review was a necessary predicate to the constitutionality of any
delegation of Article III duties to a magistrate.'89
In Gomez v. United States,"9 the Supreme Court dealt with the
delegation of part of a trial-as opposed to a pretrial proceeding-to a
magistrate-i.e., the selection of a jury. 9'
The Court reaffirmed that

184. 447 U.S. 667 (1980).
185. Id at 683.
186. Id at 679. See also United States v. Ford, 824 F.2d 1430, 1434-35 (5th Cir.
1987), cert.denied,484U.S. 1034 (1988) (Raddatz emphasizedthe difference between
pretrial and trial proceedings and suggested that where proceedings are sufficiently
preliminary to a trial, they may escape constitutional concerns.).
187. Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 678.
188. Id at 683 (emphasis added).
189. Id See also Ford,824 F.2d at 1436 (stating that Raddatz requires appellate
review of matters delegated by Article III judges to be "real and not illusory").
190. 490 U.S. 858 (1989).
191. Id The Court emphasized that "the trial commences at least from the time
when the work of empaneling the jury begins." Id at 872. See also Ford,824 F.2d
at 1435 (holding that the selection of the jury is an essential component of the trial
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appellate review of delegated matters by an Article III judge must be real and
not illusory in order to satisfy the requirements of Article III. The Gomez
court considered whether the Federal Magistrates Act granted district courts
authority to select a jury in a felony trial without the defendant's consent.
The Federal Magistrates Act grants district courts authority to assign
magistrates certain described functions as well as "such additional duties as are
'1
not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States."'
Although the Court expressly reserved the question as to whether delegation
of jury selection to a magistrate would be constitutional," 9 the court
concluded that "additional duties" did not include the selection of a jury
without the defendant's consent because it indicated that such delegation
would raise the substantial constitutional question as to whether a defendant
has a personal right to have an Article III judge preside at every critical stage
of a felony trial. 95 In particular, the Court was concerned that such a
personal right might be undermined because even if the Magistrates Act
allowed the district court to oversee jury selection, the court "harbor[ed]
serious doubts that a district judge could review this function
meaningfully."" The Court suggested that meaningful review was
impossible because "no transcript can recapture the atmosphere of the voir
dire" and that to detect prejudices a court must scrutinize "not only spoken
words but also gestures and attitudes of all participants to ensure the jury's
To avoid these potential constitutional difficulties, the
impartiality."''

itself).
192. Gomez, 490 U.S. at 874. See Note, The FederalMagistratesAct: A New
Article III Analysisfor a New Breed of Judicial Officer, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV.
253, 284-85 (1992). The Gomez holding suggests that appellate review must be real
and not illusory in order to satisfy the requirements of Article III.").
193. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) (1980).
194. See Gomez, 490 U.S. at 872 n.25.
195. See Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 932 (1991) (observing that the
holding in Gomez was motivated by the concern that a defendant has a constitutional
right to demand that an Article Ill judge preside at every critical stage of a felony
trial).
196. Gomez, 490 U.S. at 874.
197. Id at 874-75. See Note, The FederalMagistratesAct,supranote 192, at 269
("The [Gomez] Court rejected the government's argument that the availability of a
district judge to review the magistrate's decisions sufficiently safeguarded the
defendant's rights; because of the special nature of the voir dire proceeding-in which
a venireman's reactions and gestures are often as important as his responses to
questions-review of the record by a judge was particularly inadequate."). The court
observed that even if the district court had inherent power to conduct the voir dire a
second time, the time consumed by the review "would negate time initially saved by
the delegation." Gomez, 490 U.S. at 875 n.29.
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Court concluded that Congress did not intend the "additional duties" clause to
include the selection of a jury without the defendant's consent.'9 8
The reasoning of Gomez seems applicable in the bankruptcy court context
since the bankruptcy cases would in substance involve the delegation of the
trial of non-core claims to bankruptcy judges as opposed to pretrial
matters.'
In essence, bankruptcy judges would have to conduct a trial of
the non-core claims and their recommendations for dispositions of non-core
claims could also turn on factual determinations that are highly dependent on
evaluations of witness demeanor or credibility. In such circumstances, it is
questionable whether there could be meaningful review.2" Given this, there
is a risk of de facto bankruptcy adjudication of such claims. As Judith Resnik

198. Gomez, 490 U.S. at 875. The Court followed its policy "to avoid an
interpretation of a federal statute that engenders constitutional issues if a reasonable
alternative interpretation poses no constitutional questions." Id. at 864. But cf Peretz,
501 U.S. 923. In Peretz,the Supreme Court held that if the defendant consents, a
magistrate may conduct voir dire and supervise the jury selection of a felony trial
without violation of the Article III requirements. Id. at 935-36. The court explained
that although the Constitution may require the presence of an Article III judge at the
selection of a jury in a felony case, this right is personal in nature and may be waived
by the defendant). Id Thus, the Court "distinguished Gomez from Peretzon the basis
of consent." Note, Peretz v. United States: MagistratesPerform Felony Voir Dire,
70 N.C. L. REV. 1334, 1339 (1992).
The bankruptcy court adjudication of non-core claims, however, is more
analogous to the Gomez analytical framework. Litigants in a bankruptcy proceeding
who have not consented to the bankruptcy court's final adjudication of their non-core
claims cannot be reasonably viewed as waiving their constitutional right to have their
non-core claims meaningfully reviewed by an Article III judge.
199. Cf. Note, The FederalMagistrates Act, supra note 192, at 288. "This
[Gomez] analysis [extends beyond voir dire and] applies with equal force to the
practice of allowing magistrates to conduct civil jury and nonjury trials." Note, The
FederalMagistratesAct, supra note 192, at 288. Thus, the reasoning of Gomez
extends to civil cases. See Note, The FederalMagistratesAct, supranote 192, at 284
n.192.
200. The classic case of Dyer v. MacDougall, 201 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1952) is
instructive on this point. There, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
recognized thatawituess's demeanor-i.e., her carriage, behavior, bearing, manner and
appearance--is part of the evidence. Despite this, the Court of Appeals held that
demeanor evidence alone could not count as meeting a plaintiff's burden of proof. Id
at 269. Judge Learned Hand, writing for the court, explained that the result of holding
otherwise would be that a trial judge's disposition of a motion for a directed verdict
based on such demeanor evidence could not be effectively reviewed on appeal. There
could be no effective review because the demeanor evidence would have disappeared.
Thus, the trial judge would become the final arbiter in all cases where the evidence of
witnesses present in court might be determinative. Id
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has argued, given workload demands the incentives to simply adopt
bankruptcy judges' suggestions will be enormous.2"' Thus, she concludes
that in some cases the name on the opinion will be that of the Article III judge
but the real authority will be the non-Article III actor. 2 Accordingly, the
risks of de facto bankruptcy court adjudication of such claims would be
present if litigants were forced to present their non-core claims to the
bankruptcy judge where they had not consented to final bankruptcy court
adjudication of the matter. Even assuming that a district judge could
meaningfully review the bankruptcy court judge's actions by re-examining
witnesses, such duplicative effort would defeat the very efficiency arguments
that are made in favor of allowing bankruptcy judgments to bar non-core
claims.2 3 This latter point is supported by analogous cases dealing with the
question of whether bankruptcy judges have the power to conduct jury
trials." 4 A number of courts took the position that it would be impractical
for bankruptcy judges to conduct jury trials of non-core claims.0 5 Because
the bankruptcy court is unable to enter a final judgment without the consent
of the parties, any jury verdict would be subject to de novo review upon
appeal to the district court.2" This review would include the holding of a
new jury trial.20 7 Thus, courts concluded it would be impractical and
inefficient for a bankruptcy court to hold a jury trial in a non-core proceeding
where the parties have not given their consent to the bankruptcy court's
exercise of jurisdiction.0 8
Accordingly, to avoid these potential
constitutional and practical difficulties, courts should hold that bankruptcy
judgments do not operate to bar non-core claims.2"

201. See Judith Resnik, The Mythic Meaning ofArticle III Courts, 56 U. COLO.

L. REV. 581, 605 (1985).
202. See id at 606.

203. Cf Gomez, 490 U.S. at 875 n.29 ("Even assuming that a district judge could
review the magistrate's actions meaningfully by ... re-examining jurors, the time
consumed by such review would negate time initially saved by the delegations.").
204. See S.Elizabeth Gibson, Jury Trials in Bankruptcy: Obeying the Commands
ofArticle I1 and the Seventh Amendment, 72 MINN. L. REV. 967, 1031 (1988).
205. See id at 1031.
206. See Reda, Inc. v. Harris Trust & Say. Bank (In re Reda. Inc.), 60 B.R. 178,
182 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986).
207. Id
208. Id See also Gibson, supra note 204, at 1031 n. 304 (collecting cases).
209. Cf Kraakman, supra note 175, at 1044 (arguing that magistrate hearings
could cause decisionmaking authority to "slip from judicial hands...").
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2: The Problem of Unconstitutional Conditions
There may be other constitutional difficulties. In particular, one must
consider whether application of claim preclusion to bankruptcy judgments to
bar non-core claims would violate the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions holds that "government may not
condition the receipt of benefits upon the nonassertion of constitutional
rights.""' Two cases suffice to illustrate the doctrine. First, in Speiser v.
Randall,21 two veterans of World War II claimed a veteran's property tax
exemption provided by the California Constitution. California law required
applicants for the exemption to subscribe to an oath stating that the applicant
did not advocate the overthrow of the United States or the State of California.
Each refused to subscribe to the oath. The California authorities refused to
allow the exemptions, and the California Supreme Court held that such action
did not violate the procedural safeguards required by the Due Process clause
of the United States Constitution.2t2 The United States Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the applicants could not be required to give up their
constitutional right to free speech as a condition for obtaining a tax
exemption 1
Similarly, in Sherbert v. Verner,2" an employer discharged a member
of the Seventh-day Adventist Church because she would not work on
Saturday, the Sabbath Day of her church. The South Carolina Employment
Security Commission refused to give her unemployment compensation because
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her refusal to work Saturday disqualified her." 5 Ultimately, the South
Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the Commission's decision, rejecting the
contention that the relevant South Carolina law abridged her constitutional
right to the free exercise of religion." 6 The United States Supreme Court
reversed, holding that conditions on public benefits cannot be sustained if they
operate 7to inhibit, deter, or penalize the free exercise of constitutional
2
rights. 1
Although the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions has been "somewhat
eroded" in recent years,218 and although Speiser and Sherbert dealt with the
first amendment right of free expression, the doctrine should apply to the
Article III right to the protection of judicial independence." 9 As Professor
Redish has explained, "[c]onstitutional logic should not differ when the
relevant constitutional restraint is the Article III protection of judicial
' °
independence, rather than the first amendment right of free expression.12
Accordingly, if Article III values are to be protected, at some point, "the
conditioning of governmental benefits on the waiver of a right to an article III
court" violates the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.?2
Under these circumstances, one must consider whether applying claim
preclusion to bankruptcy judgments would violate the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine. If claim preclusion were applied to bankruptcy court
judgments so as to bar non-core claims, the litigant would be forced to present
such claims to the bankruptcy court. As discussed, this could result in the loss
of Article III protections through de facto adjudication.'m Arguably, this
means that litigants would have to give up their Article III rights as a
condition to receiving the benefit of having their non-core claims heard.
As a result, applying claim preclusion to bankruptcy court judgments to
bar non-core claims may violate the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.
Indeed, this situation seems closely analogous to the Supreme Court's decision
in Terral v. Burke Construction Company.' Applying the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine, Terralheld that states may not condition entry of foreign
corporations on the surrender of their constitutional right to invoke the
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jurisdiction of the federal courts.'
In the same way, litigants cannot be
coerced to give up their constitutional right to an Article III tribunal in order
to obtain the benefit of having non-core claims heard.
3. The Preservation of Article III Values
Under these circumstances, the question is whether the doctrine of res
judicata should give way in order to preserve Article III values. There is
authority to support a positive answer to this question. Principles of
preclusion should give way where their application would undermine
important constitutional rights. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Lytle
v. Household Manufacturing,Inc.m is instructive on this point. Petitioner
Lytle brought equitable and legal claims in the same action. The district court
erroneously dismissed the legal claims. The district court then conducted a
bench trial on the equitable claims and ruled against Lytle.
The Supreme Court held that issue preclusion would not bar relitigation
of the legal claims in order to preserve Lytle's Seventh Amendment right to
a jury trial on legal issues. The court explained: "Although our holding
requires a new trial in this case, we view such litigation as essential to
vindicating Lytle's Seventh Amendment rights." 6 The court expressly held
that "concern[s] about judicial economy... remains an insufficient basis for
departing from our longstanding commitment to preserving a litigant's right
to a jury trial."' 7
Lytle, then, makes clear that concern about judicial economy must giye
way in favor of preserving constitutional rights. The Marrese case provides
additional support for this proposition. There, the Supreme Court rejected the
suggestion that a federal rule should be formulated that would allow a state
court judgment to bar a claim arising within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
federal court. Although the Court acknowledged that such a rule might
promote judicial efficiency and finality, such concerns had to give way in
favor of other important concerns of our system of federalism 28 In the
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same way, federal courts should not construct a rule which would allow
bankruptcy judgments to bar non-core claims even if such a rule would
promote judicial efficiency. Such concerns of efficiency should give way in
favor of preserving Article III values.
VI. CONCLUSION
Courts of appeals are divided over the question of whether a bankruptcy
court's judgment bars further litigation of any claim that arises out of the
transaction at issue in the bankruptcy proceeding, or whether the doctrine of
claim preclusion applies only if such subsequent action would have constituted
a core-as opposed to a non-core but related-proceeding in the bankruptcy
case. This article has sought to resolve that conflict present in the circuits.
The argument holds that bankruptcy court judgments should not bar the
assertion of non-core claims. The article has argued that to allow such
judgments to bar non-core claims would be contrary to established principles
of res judicata and would threaten to undermine fundamental Article III values
or generate judicial inefficiencies in an effort to preserve such values.

jurisdiction .... More importantly, we have parallel systems of state and federal
courts, and the concerns of comity reflected in § 1738 generally allow States to
determine the preclusive scope of their own courts' judgments.").

